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Articles
The Subversion of State-to-State Investment
Treaty Arbitration
JARROD WONG*
State-to-state arbitration provisions in bilateral
investment treaties and other international investment
agreements (collectively called BITs here) have been
little used—and rightly so—given the introduction of
investor-state arbitration provisions in the same BITs.
In a handful of cases, however, some states have
sought to resurrect state-to-state arbitration, either to
contest issues already decided in separate investor-
state arbitral proceedings, or else to stave off such
proceedings. Most recently and controversially, in
Ecuador v. U.S., Ecuador initiated arbitration against
the United States under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT to
(re)arbitrate an issue that had arguably been
determined against Ecuador in a separate prior
arbitration between Ecuador and certain U.S.
investors.  This subversion of state-to-state arbitration
and its attack on the finality of arbitral awards
threaten to destabilize the investor-state arbitration
regime, which undergirds much of foreign direct
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in New Delhi, India and the 2014 American Society of International Law International
Economic Law Interest Group Biennial Research Conference.  I am grateful for the always
sterling library research assistance, with special thanks to Easton Broome and Michael
Shepherd for helping to survey the various investment treaties.  My thanks also to Afra
Afsharipour, Raquel Aldana, Anne Bloom, Linda Carter, Susan Franck, Frank Gevurtz, Amy
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Sprankling, and Jason Yackee for their comments and suggestions.  I, of course, blame them
all for any remaining errors in this paper that they failed to uncover.
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investment.  With a fresh focus on the relationship
between the two arbitral systems, this paper’s
systematic analysis of the cases reveals the interaction
of state-to-state and investor-state arbitration to be a
far more complex and ultimately disorderly affair than
was ever contemplated by the respective state parties
to the various BITs, or even appreciated in the
literature.  As it turns out, whether state-to-state
arbitration is permissible, or at least not proscribed,
when investor-state arbitration is available to resolve
the same issue turns awkwardly on a number of ill-
fitting factors, including whether the actor initiating
state-to-state arbitration is the host state or home
state, and whether the investor has consented to
investor-state arbitration.  Much of the blame for this
incongruous state of affairs can be pinned on the
unfortunately drafted Article 27(1) of the ICSID
Convention.  This paper argues for a reconception of
the relationship between the two arbitral regimes that
accords better with their historical narrative and
purpose, as well as that of the ICSID Convention.  The
more coherent approach here is to treat the two
arbitral regimes as mutually exclusive, and disallow
state-to-state arbitration of any issue that may
properly be resolved by investor-state arbitration.  In
this way, duplicative arbitral proceedings and the
potential for conflicting awards are averted, and the
investment dispute is safely insulated from the
vagaries and astrictions of politics and so-called
diplomacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Investor-state arbitration was designed to supersede and has
indeed supplanted all other means of resolving disputes arising under
investment treaties, including state-to-state arbitration.  In a number
of cases, however, certain states have sought subversively to
resurrect state-to-state arbitration either to rearbitrate or displace
issues properly decided in investor-state arbitration.  As it turns out,
the relationship between the two arbitral regimes is extraordinarily
complicated, yet little studied.  What limited authorities exist suggest
that whether state-to-state arbitration is permitted when investor-state
arbitration is available depends on such incoherent factors as whether
and when investor-state arbitration is initiated in relation to state-to-
state arbitration, and whether it is the host or home state that initiates
state-to-state arbitration.  I argue that the relationship should be
reconceived such that the two arbitral regimes are treated as mutually
exclusive, and to disallow state-to-state arbitration of any issue that
may be resolved by investor-state arbitration.  This approach prevents
duplicative arbitral proceedings and conflicting awards, shields
investment disputes from entanglement with politics and diplomatic
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protection efforts, and better reflects the primacy of investor-state
arbitration and thus the historical purpose of the two arbitral regimes
in relation to each other.
Perhaps the most significant innovation of the modern
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) is the ability it confers on the private
investor unilaterally and directly to initiate arbitral proceedings
against the host state for a breach of the BIT in relation to its
investment in that state.1  As a result, an investor no longer has to
look to its home state to pursue a claim under the doctrine of
diplomatic protection, an inherently unreliable and discretionary
process.  Investor-state arbitration has proven so successful that it has
been all but forgotten that many BITs also contain state-to-state
arbitration provisions that authorize either state party to initiate
arbitral proceedings against the other state to resolve any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the BIT.  These state-
to-state arbitration BIT provisions effectively enable a home state to
extend diplomatic protection to its nationals (the investors) by
pursuing an arbitration claim against the host state for injury to the
relevant investment.2  The need, however, for diplomatic protection
of investments diminished substantially once investor-state
arbitration became available through BITs.  State-to-state arbitration
has instead been relied upon predominantly to resolve territorial
boundary disputes and in post-conflict settlements.  Indeed, although
state-to-state arbitration BIT provisions have existed for decades,
they have been invoked rarely and without attention.  Recently,
however, Ecuador set off a storm of controversy when it filed a
request for UNCITRAL state-to-state arbitration in 2011 against the
United States under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.3
1. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY,
POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 58 (2010); Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral
Investment Treaties:  Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide between
Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 135, 142 (2006) (“From the investor’s perspective, this ability to submit an investment
dispute to international arbitration is one of the BIT’s chief benefits.”).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See Request of the Republic of Ecuador to the U.S. Pursuant to Article VII of the
Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Republic of Ecuador v. U.S., PCA Case No. 2012-5
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1455; see
also Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-15 (1997) [hereinafter U.S.-Ecuador
BIT]; Luke E. Peterson, Ecuador Initiates Unusual State-To-State Arbitration Against
United States In Bid To Clarify Scope Of Investment Treaty Obligation, INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION REPORTER (July 4, 2011), available at http://www.iareporter.com
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Ecuador’s complaint against the United States originated
from a separate prior arbitration between Ecuador and certain U.S.
investors.4  In Chevron and TexPet v. Ecuador, the investor-state
arbitral tribunal had determined, inter alia, that the failure of
Ecuadorean courts to adjudicate several cases filed by Texaco
Petroleum for over a decade constituted a violation by Ecuador of
Article II(7) of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, which requires “each Party
[to] provide effective means of asserting rights and claims with
respect to investment, investment agreements, and investment
authorizations.”5  In the process, the tribunal determined that Article
II(7) provided an independent treaty obligation with a higher bar than
the standard for denial of justice under customary international law.6
Ecuador subsequently protested to the United States concerning what
it regarded as a misinterpretation of Article II(7), and upon receiving
no substantive response, initiated an arbitral proceeding against the
United States pursuant to Article VII(1) of the same BIT, which
provides that “[a]ny dispute between the Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the Treaty . . . shall be submitted,
upon the request of either Party, to an arbitral tribunal for binding
decision in accordance with the applicable rules of international
law.”7  While the decision has not been made public, the U.S.
Department of State website reports that the Ecuador v. U.S. tribunal
ultimately dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that there was no “dispute” between the state parties.8
Ecuador v. U.S. raises a host of vexing questions concerning
the availability of state-to-state arbitration under a BIT and its
relationship to investor-state arbitration more generally.  These
questions remain very much on the table, for in resolving the case on
the basis of a lack of a “dispute,” the Ecuador v. U.S. tribunal did not
have to reach the more fundamental questions concerning the nature
/articles/20110704_4.
4. See Request of the Republic of Ecuador to the U.S., supra note 3, ¶¶ 6–10.
5. U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 3, art. II(7).
6. See Chevron Corp. (U.S.) and Texaco Petroleum Co. (U.S.) v. Republic of
Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, Partial Award on the Merits, ¶ 225 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0151.pdf.
7. U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 3, art. VII(1).
8. While the various briefs and submissions of both parties are available publicly, the
award itself is not published. See Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA
Case No. 2012-5, ITALAW.COM, http://www.italaw.com/cases/1494 (last visited Nov. 18,
2014).  The result was, however, summarily communicated on the U.S. Department of State
website. See U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S.-Ecuador BIT:  Ecuador v. United States, STATE.GOV,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c53491.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
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and scope of state-to-state arbitration under the BIT.  In challenging
the very issue already decided in Chevron and TexPet v. Ecuador,
albeit in a different forum, Ecuador was seeking the proverbial
second bite of the apple.  While such parallel proceedings do not
strictly compete with each other insofar as they involve different
parties, they may well lead to conflicting awards when they deal in
essence with the same claim.  Yet, nothing in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT,
including Article VII(1)—which is similar if not identical to the
state-to-state arbitration provisions in many other BITs9—technically
prevents Ecuador from rearbitrating the issue in such a way.
On the surface, there appears to be little guidance on how to
make sense of the relationship between the two arbitral regimes in
Ecuador v. U.S.  Consulting a broader perspective of the
development of BITs is also not immediately helpful.  What history
we have suggests that investor-state arbitration provisions were
introduced into the earliest BITs without much thought as to their
interaction with preexisting state-to-state arbitration provisions.10
Even the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention)11—to which over 150 states are party, although not
including Ecuador—does not speak comprehensively to the issue.
While Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention does consider the
relationship between investor-state and state-to-state arbitration, it
focuses on prohibiting abuses of diplomatic protection, and applies to
home states seeking to extend such protection to those of its nationals
who have already consented to submit to investor-state arbitration.12
9. See Clovis J. Trevino, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration and the
Interplay with Investor-State Arbitration under the Same Treaty, 5 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 199, 200 (2014) (“Almost all BITs provide that treaty parties may resort to
state-to-state arbitration over treaty ‘interpretation or/and application.’  Similar formulations,
with variations and different levels of detail as to the negotiation or consultation phase, the
applicable rules of procedure or the applicable law, are to be found in virtually every BIT.”)
(citations omitted).
10. See infra Part I.
11. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
12. Specifically, Article 27(1) provides that:
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international
claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting
State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration
under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to
abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.
Id. art. 27(1); see infra Part I.
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In any event, Ecuador, having formally denounced the ICSID
Convention in 2009,13 is no longer a party to the Convention.  It turns
out, however, that a closer parsing of these and other legal authorities
reveals a partial blueprint for aligning the two arbitral regimes,
namely that state-to-state arbitration should be precluded for any
investment treaty issue that may be resolved through investor-state
arbitration.
It bears emphasizing that how we make sense of this
relationship between investor-state and state-to-state arbitration can
have profound implications for the existing investment arbitral
regime.  If a respondent state can now initiate state-to-state
arbitration for any case it loses in prior investor-state arbitration, or
conversely, a home state for any claim its nationals lose in prior
investor-state arbitration, then few BIT claims ostensibly resolved in
arbitral proceedings are safe.  This includes all claims resolved
against host states through arbitration under the auspices of ICSID,
the predominant arbitral forum for investment claims.14  Such dual
procedures can only destabilize an investment arbitral regime
premised critically on the finality of awards.15
Notwithstanding the stakes involved, however, the
surprisingly complex and convoluted relationship between investor-
state and state-to-state investment treaty arbitration has not been
systematically examined.  More than simply a clash between two
different procedures, the two arbitral paradigms are dynamic
phenomena that interact in at least five distinct ways:
 When a home state or an investor seeks state-to-state
arbitration after the investor has consented to investor-
state arbitration;
13. See Int’l Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes News Release, Ecuador




14. See generally Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 40 (2007).
15. It bears observance here that modern governance of foreign direct investment
(FDI) is effected primarily through investment treaties, with 2012 global FDI flows valued at
$1.35 trillion and projected to grow to $1.8 trillion by 2015. See United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2013, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2013, at xxi, 2 (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
wir2013_en.pdf.  Even though investment arbitration was largely unknown until just two
decades ago, the total number of publicly identified investment arbitrations, in a context of
nearly 2,900 BITs, is at least 514 today. Id. at x, xxi.
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 When a home state or an investor seeks state-to-state
arbitration before the investor has consented to
investor-state arbitration;
 When a BIT requires investor-state arbitration to be
conducted through state-to-state arbitration;
 When a host state initiates state-to-state arbitration
after the investor has consented to investor-state
arbitration; and
 When a host state initiates state-to-state arbitration
before the investor has consented to investor-state
arbitration.
Presently, the limited legal authorities available suggest that
whether state-to-state arbitration is permissible when investor-state
arbitration is also involved, or at least not categorically prohibited,
can depend on which scenario above is implicated.  The principal
cause, or less charitably, blame, for this needlessly complicated state
of affairs resides in Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention, which
begins to, but does not comprehensively tackle, the problem of
potentially conflicting awards.  More broadly, what this mismatched
patchwork of permutations also suggests is that state governments, in
negotiating their BITs, were themselves unclear on the scope of state-
to-state arbitration, particularly as it relates to investor-state
arbitration.
This paper argues that the relationship between the two
arbitral regimes should be reordered so as to accord with the history
and purpose of each regime and the ICSID Convention.  Investor-
state arbitration was designed to displace diplomatic protection,
including through state-to-state arbitration, and thereby allow the
investor effectively to seek redress for injury to its investment in a
depoliticized environment.  Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention
reflects, if imperfectly, such a prioritization of investor-state
arbitration, as does the relevant case law, which has refused to
sanction the subversion of state-to-state arbitration in aid of
dislodging investor-state arbitration.  The very narrative of modern
international investment law, which features investor-state arbitration
as the dominant means of investment treaty dispute resolution while
state-to-state arbitration languishes in almost complete dormancy,
further supports according primacy to investor-state arbitration.
Moreover, such prioritization is to be preferred as a matter of
procedure and due process since the host state is a party in either set
of proceedings, but the third party investor will face a greater
challenge than the third party home state in securing any meaningful
participation in state-to-state and investor-state arbitration,
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respectively.  Accordingly, I advocate treating the two systems as
mutually exclusive, and barring state-to-state arbitration of any
dispute that can be or is appropriately resolved through investor-state
arbitration.  While acknowledging the risk of duplicative proceedings
leading to conflicting awards, other commentators have taken a
different view, and are content to live with the web of permutations,
but trusting one of the tribunals to stay its proceedings based on
nebulous notions of good faith, or even endorsing this larger role of
state-to-state arbitration through an after-the-fact characterization of
the system as inherently hybridized, thereby advancing the interests
of host states at the expense of investors.16  These alternative
approaches all fail to recognize, however, the purposive primacy of
investor-state arbitration as ultimately gleaned from the ICSID
Convention, the history of investment treaties, and the relevant case
law.
Part I outlines the history of the development of state-to-state
and investor-state arbitration under BITs, and the treatment of their
relationship in the ICSID Convention.  Part II provides a chronology
of the cases relating to state-to-state arbitration that also implicate
investor-state arbitration.  Part III examines and summarizes the
present convoluted interaction between state-to-state and investor-
state arbitration, tracing much of it to Article 27(1) of the ICSID
Convention in the process.  Part IV argues that the existing structure
of the relationship between the two arbitral regimes is not entirely
consistent with their history and purpose or the ICSID Convention.  It
proposes instead a realignment of the relationship that recognizes the
priority of investor-state arbitration by proscribing state-to-state
arbitration of any dispute that may properly be resolved through
investor-state arbitration.  In the process, the paper negotiates legal
and other obstacles to adopting such an approach, including
alternative proposals for resolving the tension between the two
arbitral regimes.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE-TO-STATE AND INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES
Modern state-to-state arbitration took hold in the eighteenth
century and has been predominantly used in post-conflict settlements
16. See infra Part IV.
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and the resolution of territorial boundary disputes.17  Before the
advent of BITs, however, state-to-state arbitration had a role to play
in the protection of foreign property under bilateral treaties of
friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCNs)—the predecessors of
BITs.  European powers were engaged in the practice of concluding
FCNs from as early as the 1820s.18  The United States had been
concluding such treaties even earlier, at least since the 1770s.19
FCNs were primarily designed to establish and govern trade relations
between state parties, although certain treaties also contained
provisions that incidentally addressed the protection of foreign
property.  Insofar as they provided for dispute resolution, the primary
forum was a domestic court and thus the early FCNs sought to ensure
that foreign nationals had the right to appear in local courts.20
Certain FCNs did, however, contain state-to-state arbitration clauses,
with some of these clauses getting fair mileage in the process.  For
example, the 1794 FCN between the United States and Great Britain
contained an arbitration clause that covered disputes involving, inter
alia, the confiscation of property, which resulted in over five hundred
arbitral awards in just a five-year span from 1799 to 1804.21  State-to-
state arbitration continued to be used by states on behalf of their
nationals as one of the occasional means of resolving property
disputes throughout the nineteenth century.  On the cusp of the
twentieth century, arbitration in general received a boost with the
conclusion of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference and the
establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, with countries
concluding general arbitration treaties as well as introducing
arbitration clauses into their FCNs.22
Beginning in 1914, however, the global turmoil engendered
by two world wars and the Great Depression significantly hobbled
the international investment regime and it was not until after 1945
that the negotiation of FCNs resumed in earnest.23  Though in the
post-war era, the investment protection function rather than the trade
17. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 439 (2012)
(“Territorial boundary disputes and post-conflict settlements were particularly common
subjects of state-to-state arbitration.”).
18. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 21.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 24.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 31.
23. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES 21–24 (2009).
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aspect of FCNs came to dominate as capital markets began to turn
around.24  At the same time, the increasingly strident self-assertion of
capital-importing states and the implementation of social economic
policies in the 1950s significantly increased the risks for foreign
investments of expropriations and nationalizations.25  The resulting
uncertainty drove capital-exporting states to secure higher standards
of investment protection than those available under customary
international law, leading ultimately to the conclusion of the first
bilateral investment treaties and other international investment
agreements, which this Article collectively refers to as BITs herein.
Unlike FCNs, BITs generally protected investment (as opposed to
property) and, indeed, addressed investment-related issues
exclusively.26  But the early BITs of the 1960s did resemble FCNs
insofar as they provided only for the resolution of investment
disputes between states through submission of the dispute to an
arbitral tribunal or the International Court of Justice.27
Because only governments could access the state-to-state
arbitration provisions in FCNs and the early BITs, investors had to
look to their home states to initiate arbitration to resolve their
investment disputes.  Home states are under no obligation, however,
to initiate such arbitration or exercise diplomatic protection, which
may not even be possible if the investor has not exhausted all
available local remedies.  Indeed, home states are often and
understandably wary of expending precious political capital to
engage in what may well become a charged dispute deleterious to
both state parties.  Even if the home state acts on behalf of the
investor, it is the home state that has full discretion and control over
the process.  The home state is not even obligated to pass on to the
investor any monetary compensation awarded as a result.28  In short,
the injured investor may not have much of a remedy at all in relying
upon state-to-state arbitration or more conventional diplomatic
protection mechanisms.
To address this shortfall, several early multilateral investment
initiatives separately provided for investor-state arbitration that
would have entitled the investor independently to bring an arbitral
claim against the host state concerning certain investment disputes.
24. See id. at 24.
25. See id.
26. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 55.
27. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 23, at 44.
28. See Ben Juratowitch, The Relationship between Diplomatic Protection and
Investment Treaties, 23 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 10, 13–14 (2008).
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These proposals, including the International Law Commission’s 1948
Draft Statute of the Arbitral Tribunal for Foreign Investment and
Draft Statute of the Foreign Investments Court,29 and the 1959 Abs-
Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad,30 were never
adopted.  They did, however, pave the way for the one initiative that
did succeed:  the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID
Convention).  Established under the auspices of the World Bank,
ICSID is not a permanent arbitral tribunal, but rather a legal
framework and neutral venue for the resolution of investment
disputes between Contracting States and investors who are nationals
of other Contracting States.  It is designed as such to engender “an
atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus stimulat[e] a larger flow
of private international capital into those countries [that] wish to
attract it.”31  The broad operative concept is that a Contracting State
and a national from another Contracting State would consent in
writing to binding arbitration under the ICSID Convention of future
investment disputes, thereby allowing the investor to proceed directly
against the host state in such a dispute without the need also to
involve the home state.32  In this way, otherwise contentious
confrontations between states would be avoided and the relevant
investment dispute “depoliticized.”  As put by Ibrahim Shihata,
former Secretary General of ICSID and General Counsel of the
World Bank, ICSID provides:  “A forum for conflict resolution in a
framework which carefully balances the interests and requirements of
all the parties involved, and attempts in particular to ‘depoliticize’ the
settlement of investment disputes.”33  Given this purpose of
29. See INT’L LAW ASS’N, DRAFT STATUTES OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL FOR FOREIGN
INVESTMENT AND THE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS COURT (1948), reprinted in United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, International Investment Instruments:  A
Compendium, Vol. III, 259–72, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTCI/30(Vol.III) (1996).
30. See The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment:  A Round
Table, 9 J. PUB. L. 115, 116–18 (1960).
31. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, in 1
ICSID REP. 23, 25.
32. See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 25(1) (“The jurisdiction of the Centre
shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the
Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.  When the parties have given their
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”).
33. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes:
The Role of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 4 (1986).
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introducing investor-state arbitration, it is unsurprising then that the
ICSID Convention took steps to circumscribe the ability of states to
act on behalf of the investment interests of their nationals, including
by way of state-to-state arbitration.  Indeed, allowing the latter
presented the additional acute danger that the same claim would be
the subject of two different arbitral procedures resulting in
conflicting awards.  Accordingly, Article 27(1) of the ICSID
Convention provides that:
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection,
or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute
which one of its nationals and another Contracting
State shall have consented to submit or shall have
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless
such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide
by and comply with the award rendered in such
dispute.34
As noted in Christoph Schreuer’s seminal treatise on the
ICSID Convention, the rationale for the phrase “or bring an
international claim” is “the existence of arbitration clauses in many
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) for the settlement of disputes
between the State parties to the treaties,”35 i.e., state-to-state
arbitration provisions.  Specifically, the drafters of the Convention
were concerned that permitting both investor-state and state-to-state
arbitration of essentially the same claim could lead to inconsistent
awards.36  Although such parallel proceedings technically involve
different parties, the potential for conflict exists since the scope of the
state-to-state arbitration provision is usually broad enough to extend
to the investor’s claim itself.37  Instructively, the drafters chose to
subordinate state-to-state arbitration to investor-state arbitration in
Article 27(1) by prohibiting home states from initiating state-to-state
arbitration when the relevant investor has submitted to investor-state
arbitration.
While Article 27(1) attempts to address this problem, it is
flawed.  On its terms, Article 27(1) bars a home state from initiating
state-to-state arbitration to protect its nationals who have consented
to investor-state arbitration, but not a host state from initiating state-
34. ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 27(1) (emphasis added).
35. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 420
(2d ed. 2009).
36. See id. at 420 (“This possibility [of two different arbitration procedures arising
from the same claim] greatly concerned the drafters of the Convention.”).
37. See id. at 421.
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to-state arbitration to protect itself concerning claims by an investor
who has consented to investor-state arbitration.  Yet, both scenarios
carry the same potential for conflict.  Just as a home state might
subsequently initiate state-to-state arbitration of a claim that an
investor has lost in prior investor-state arbitration, a host state could
subsequently initiate state-to-state arbitration of a claim that it lost in
prior investor-state arbitration.  In both situations, the subsequent
state-to-state arbitration might lead to an award that conflicts with the
prior award issued in the earlier investor-state arbitration.  Further,
Article 27(1) bars a home state from relying on state-to-state
arbitration only at the point when its national has consented to
investor-state arbitration.  This means that a home state can, in
collusion with its national, strategically bring state-to-state arbitration
proceedings before its national consents to investor-state arbitration,
thereby potentially allowing for both sets of proceedings.  The upshot
is that Article 27(1) fails comprehensively to tackle the problem it
sought to address, i.e., that of potentially conflicting awards, but
nonetheless reflects a prioritization of investor-state arbitration over
state-to-state arbitration.
The early BITs only provided for the resolution of investment
disputes through state-to-state arbitration or the submission of the
dispute by states to the International Court of Justice.38  In the wake
of the establishment of ICSID, BITs began to include investor-state
arbitration alongside state-to-state arbitration provisions.39  It is not
clear, however, that most state parties specifically considered the
relationship between the two.  Of note is the fact that many, if not
most, BITs that contain both state-to-state and investor-state
provisions are silent on the relationship between the two.40  Further,
it is also of note that certain subsequent BITs—including between
ICSID Contracting States for which it would not have been strictly
38. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 23, at 44.
39. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Egypt-U.K.,
June 11, 1975, arts. 8–9, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 97 (Cmnd. 6639); see also Trevino, supra note 9,
at 201 (“[S]tate-to-state and investor-state arbitration clauses co-exist in almost all BITs.”).
40. The author has examined more than 160 BITs that are silent as to the relationship
between the state-to-state and investor-state provisions contained in the agreements. See,
e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Afg.-
Ger., Apr. 20, 2005, 2554 U.N.T.S. 119; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Gren., May 2, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-25 (1986);
Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Alb.-
China, Feb. 13, 1993, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/
2/treaty/9; Agreement for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Alb.-Croat., Mar. 5, 1993, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country
/2/treaty/10 (full list on file with the author).
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necessary—contained language akin to Article 27 while others did
not suggest this to be the case.  For instance, Article 13(8) of the
Netherlands-Peru BIT (both parties to the BIT being ICSID
Contracting States) provides in part that:
Neither Contracting Party shall give diplomatic
protection or bring an international claim with respect
to a dispute which one of its nationals and the other
Contracting Party have submitted to a competent
international arbitral tribunal . . . unless such other
Contracting Party does not abide by and comply with
the award rendered in such dispute.41
Conversely, there are BITs involving at least one non-ICSID state
party that provide for both state-to-state and investor-state arbitration
without clarifying the relationship between the two, and to which the
ICSID Convention is inapplicable.42  A plausible explanation is that
state-to-state arbitration provisions were simply carried over from
FCNs, the predecessors of BITs,43 and that states were subsequently
introducing investor-state arbitration provisions into BITs alongside
the state-to-state arbitration provisions without particular thought as
to their relationship, never mind potential conflict.  These states
likely did not contemplate looking to state-to-state arbitration to
resolve investment disputes.  And why should they?  Today, as has
historically been the case, state-to-state arbitration continues to be
used predominantly to resolve territorial boundary disputes and in
post-conflict settlements.44  It is also telling that, while state-to-state
41. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-
Peru, art. 13(8), Dec. 27, 1994, 1948 U.N.T.S. 97.
42. See, e.g., Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Neth.-S. Afr., May 9, 1995, 2066 U.N.T.S. 413; Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, Greece-S. Afr., Nov. 19, 1998, 2528 U.N.T.S. 185; Agreement for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Mauritius-S. Afr., Feb. 17, 1998, available at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/134/treaty/2527; Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-Can., Nov. 5, 1991, 2467 U.N.T.S. 97
(Canada had not ratified ICSID at the time); Agreement Regarding the Promotion and
Mutual Protection of Investments, Leb.-Russ., Apr. 7, 1999, available at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1893; Agreement on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of the Investments, Lith.-Russ., June 29, 1999,
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1921.
43. See Trevino, supra note 9, at 201 (“These [BIT state-to-state arbitration] clauses
are modeled after the compromissory clauses found in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation (FCN Treaties), the predecessors of BITs.”).
44. See BORN, supra note 17, at 439; see also Chang-fa Lo, Relations and Possible
Interactions between State-State Dispute Settlement and Investor-State Arbitration Under
BITs, 6(1) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 1, 8 n.12 (2013) (“[The] Permanent Court of Arbitration
2014] THE SUBVERSION OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 21
arbitration provisions in BITs have now been around for decades,
they have been little used.  Still, for much of that time, it didn’t
matter that these provisions fell into desuetude.  Recently, however,
Ecuador v. U.S. has ignited a controversy in demonstrating how
state-to-state arbitration can be subverted for purposes inconsistent
with prevailing investment law norms and serve as timely, if
ominous, reminders of why we should care.
(PCA) plays the key role in handling dispute [sic] between states through state-state
arbitration.  But the vast majority of the disputes concerns boundary disputes.”).
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II. INVESTMENT CASE LAW CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN STATE-TO-STATE AND INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION
This Section describes in chronological order the handful of
decisions that touch materially on the relationship between state-to-
state and investor-state arbitration.  In the process, it comments upon
the decisions and summarizes the current state of the law in this area.
A. Banro American v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (2000)
Banro American arose under mining and oil agreements
rather than a BIT, but is nonetheless instructive on the relationship
between investor-state and state-to-state arbitration.45  In that case,
Banro Resource, a Canadian company, had sought and secured the
diplomatic protection of Canada in its dispute with the Congo
government under mining and oil agreements between the parties.  At
the same time, Banro American, a U.S. subsidiary of Banro
Resource, had initiated ICSID arbitration against the Congo
government with respect to the same dispute.  The tribunal held that
this was improper, as it amounted to seeking diplomatic protection
and ICSID arbitration simultaneously or successively, which was
prohibited under Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention.46  Even
though Article 27(1) only applied on its terms to states, the tribunal
held that it nonetheless applied to investors when interpreted in
tandem with Article 26 (which provides in relevant part that
“[c]onsent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall,
unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the
exclusion of any other remedy”)47:
Regarding the purpose and aim of the ICSID
Convention, [Articles 26 and 27] are to exclude
diplomatic protection, along with its political
drawbacks, for the benefit of arbitration channels.  As
[Christoph Schreuer] writes, “A choice between
45. See Banro American Res., Inc. & Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema
S.A.R.L. v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/7, Award of the Tribunal (Sept. 1,
2000) (excerpts), 17 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 382 (2002).
46. See id. ¶¶ 19–20.
47. ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 26.
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ICSID arbitration and diplomatic protection appears to
be contrary to at least some of the avowed purposes of
Article 27.”  If the investor does not have the choice
between the two channels, even less so does he have
the right to resort to one or the other, whether
simultaneously, or successively.  Therefore since the
ICSID Convention has as its purpose and aim to
protect the host State from diplomatic intervention on
the part of the national State of the investor and to
“depoliticize” investment relations, it would go
against this aim and purpose to expose the host State
to, at the same time, both diplomatic pressure and an
arbitration claim.48
Accordingly, the tribunal held that Article 27, read in light of Article
26, “ought to be interpreted as foreclosing the investor from using a
plurality of channels.”49  Thus, while Canada—which was not then a
party to the ICSID Convention—was free to provide diplomatic
protection to its nationals including Banro Resource, the
Banro Group . . . was not free to submit to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo both diplomatic
intervention on the part of the Canadian Government,
availing itself of the nationality of its parent company,
Banro Resource, and an arbitration proceeding before
an ICSID tribunal by availing itself of the American
nationality of one of its subsidiaries, Banro
American.50
In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal is arguably straining
the language of Article 27, which plainly refers only to (home) states
and not to investors.  Further, the operation of both Articles 26 and
27(1) are only triggered upon the investor’s consenting to investor-
state arbitration, which apparently would allow for any diplomatic
protection, including through state-to-state arbitration, that takes
place before the initiation of investor-state arbitration (typically
coincident with the investor consenting to arbitration).  The tribunal’s
acrobatics highlight the flawed nature of Article 27.  But they also
suggest that the more sensible approach is to prioritize investor-state
arbitration when both mechanisms are available, consistent with the
history and the spirit, if not quite the letter, of Article 27.
48. Banro American Res., Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/7, Award of the Tribunal,
¶ 19 (quoting SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 35).
49. Id. ¶ 20.
50. Id. ¶ 23.
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B. Lucchetti v. Peru (2005)
In Lucchetti v. Peru, a Chilean investor, Lucchetti, filed an
ICSID arbitral claim against Peru in 2002, invoking the investor-state
arbitration provisions of the Peru-Chile BIT.51  In response, Peru
initiated state-to-state arbitration against Chile pursuant to the same
BIT and then requested that the Lucchetti v. Peru tribunal suspend its
proceedings pending the resolution of the state-to-state arbitration.52
Rejecting Peru’s request, “the [Lucchetti v. Peru tribunal] found that
the conditions for a suspension of the proceedings were not met.”53
It is not clear on what basis or legal authority the tribunal rested its
decision, as no additional information is publicly available on the
tribunal’s determination, and the Peru-Chile BIT is silent on the
relationship between the two arbitral mechanisms.  Further, although
both Peru and Chile are parties to the ICSID Convention, Article
27(1) would not on its terms be applicable here since it bars only
home and not host states, and Peru had initiated state-to-state
arbitration in the capacity of a host state.54  Presumably, the tribunal
was never going to abide by Peru’s naked bid to circumvent investor-
state arbitration, but it would have been helpful to learn precisely on
what rationale the tribunal based its conclusion.  Regardless, the
tribunal’s decision indicates that state-to-state arbitration should not
be permitted to displace investor-state arbitration on the same issue.
Peru abandoned the state-to-state arbitral proceedings thereafter.55
C. Italy v. Cuba (2008)
Italy v. Cuba involved disputes between various Italian
investors and Cuban state entities.56  The Italian government invoked
51. See Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Perú, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/4, Award, ¶ 3 (Feb. 7, 2005).
52. See id. ¶ 7.
53. Id. ¶ 9.
54. See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 27(1).
55. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 234 (2d ed. 2012).
56. See Republic of It. v. Republic of Cuba, Sentence Préliminaire [Interim Award]
(Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0434_0.pdf; Republic of It. v. Republic of Cuba, Sentence Finale [Final
Award] (Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0435_0.pdf.  Because the awards are only available in French, the author has
relied in part on separate English case digests of the arbitration. See Orlando F. Cabrera C.,
The Republic of Italy v. The Republic of Cuba (Ad Hoc Arbitration), Final Award,
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the state-to-state arbitration provisions of the Italy-Cuba BIT and
brought two categories of claims against Cuba.  One category was
premised on the diplomatic protection of the Italian investors, while
the other was ostensibly based on the violation of Italy’s own
rights.57  According to a summary of the case:
Italy claimed that through the actions of different
entities, such as the Cuban Central Bank and the
Cuban Chamber of Commerce, Cuba discriminated
against Italian investors, including by denying them
fair and equitable treatment, national treatment and
full protection and security.  Italy also sought from
Cuba a symbolic compensation of one Euro for the
violation of the letter and spirit of the BIT.58
All of the claims were ultimately dismissed for a number of
jurisdictional and merits-related reasons.59
At first glance, it seems unusual, even strategic, for the home
state rather than the investors to have initiated arbitration for what in
essence was alleged injury to the investors.  Indeed, one of the
preliminary objections Cuba raised was that “Italy was not entitled to
initiate a proceeding for diplomatic protection on the basis of
[A]rticle 10 of the BIT.  Under this provision, Italy could only bring
a dispute in its own name regarding the interpretation and application
of the treaty.”60  However, this course of action may have been the
result of the unique structure of the Italy-Cuba BIT, which on one
view shunts investor-state arbitration through state-to-state
arbitration.  Article 9 of the Italy-Cuba BIT governs the settlement of
investor-state disputes and specifically allows the investor to elect for
arbitration, pursuant to Article 10, of any investment dispute between
the parties that is not resolved amicably after six months.61  In turn,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CASE LAW, 3 (Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.international
arbitrationcaselaw.com/new-cases/republicofitalyvrepublicofcubafinalawarddiplomatic
protectioncasebyorlandofcabrerac; Larisa Babiy, Decisions Published in Rare State-to-State
Dispute Between Italy and Cuba, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (July 19, 2012),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012 /07/19/awards-and-decisions-8/.
57. See Republic of It. v. Republic of Cuba, Sentence finale (Final Award), ¶¶ 46–48,
55; see also Cabrera, supra note 56, at 3.
58. Babiy, supra note 56.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See Tra Il della Repubblica Italiana e il Governo della Repubblica di Cuba sulla
Promozione e Protezione degli Investimenti [Agreement between the Government of the
Italian Republic and the Government of the Republic of Cuba on the Promotion and
Protection of Investments], Cuba-It., arts. 9–10, May 7, 1993 [hereinafter Italy-Cuba BIT],
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Article 10 of the BIT governs settlement of disputes between the
state parties and provides for ad hoc arbitration by a tribunal
appointed by the state parties that will establish its own procedural
rules.62  As such, conventional investor-state arbitration would not
appear to be available under the Italy-Cuba BIT, and any disputes
between investors and the host state would have to be resolved
through state-to-state arbitration mechanisms.  In other words, under
this reading, the Italian investors had no choice but to rely on Italy to
initiate state-to-state arbitration under the BIT to resolve their
disputes.
While the tribunal rejected Cuba’s preliminary objection to
Italy’s initiation of a state-to-state arbitration for the investor claims,
the tribunal did so not because the investors lacked such ability, but
because they had not yet consented to investor-state arbitration under
Article 9.63  The tribunal determined that so long as the investor had
not yet consented or submitted to arbitration with the host state, the
home state was not barred from espousing the investor claims.64  That
is, the tribunal did not read Articles 9 and 10 as channeling investor-
state arbitration through the framework of state-to-state arbitration.
Instead, the tribunal treated Article 9 as a standard investor-state
arbitration provision, but decided nonetheless that Italy was not
precluded from exercising diplomatic protection because the Italian
investors had not yet in its view submitted to investor-state
arbitration.  This conclusion, even if questionable for its assumption,
is significant because nothing in Articles 9 and 10, or anywhere else
in the BIT, speaks to the timing or coordination between investor-
state and state-to-state arbitration.65  Rather, the tribunal looked to
and based its decision on Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention,
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/52/treaty/1127. This is not a
typical formulation for BITs. Compare id., with U.S.-Educador BIT, supra note 3. See also
W. Michael Reisman, Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction in the Interstate Arbitration
Initiated by Ecuador against the United States, ¶ 36, Republic of Ecuador v. U.S., PCA No.
2012-5 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) [hereinafter Reisman Opinion], available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1061.pdf (“In contrast to the
vast majority of modern BITs, the [Italy-Cuba] BIT, which appears to be unique in both
Italy’s and Cuba’s BIT practice, has no analogue to Article VI [of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT]
(i.e., a separate track dedicated to investor-state arbitration).  Rather, it assigns a single
arbitral procedure for inter-state and investor-state disputes in which the States-parties
establish and select the panel.”).
62. Italy-Cuba BIT, supra note 61, art. 10; see Reisman Opinion, supra note 61, ¶ 36.
63. See Republic of It. v. Republic of Cuba, Sentence Sentence Préliminaire [Interim
Award], ¶ 65.
64. See id.
65. See generally Italy-Cuba BIT, supra note 61.
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even though Cuba is not a party to the ICSID Convention and the
Italy-Cuba BIT provides for ad hoc arbitration and is not subject to
the ICSID Convention.  In the tribunal’s estimation, the absence of a
similar provision in the BIT did not prevent the application “by
analogy” of the principle embedded in Article 27.66  Such an
extension of Article 27(1) is difficult to justify since Cuba did not
agree to the rule, and Article 27(1) can hardly be said to constitute
customary international law.  If, however, we accept the decision,
two critical implications of Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention
arise from its conclusion: First, Article 27(1) represents a general
principle of broad application beyond the confines of the ICSID
Convention; and second, Article 27(1) is reasonably interpreted to
permit state-to-state arbitration initiated before but not after the
initiation of investor-state arbitration.
D. Ecuador v. U.S. (2012)
Ecuador v. U.S. has its genesis in a much earlier dispute
between Ecuador and certain U.S. investors.  Between 1991 and
1993, Texaco Petroleum (TexPet) brought claims in Ecuadorean
courts against Ecuador for the breach of various agreements between
the parties.67  Even though TexPet had submitted its evidence by the
mid-1990s, the courts did not adjudicate the cases.68  In 2006, TexPet
and Chevron (which had acquired TexPet in the interim) filed a
request for arbitration against Ecuador pursuant to the U.S.-Ecuador
BIT, arguing, inter alia, that the Ecuadorean courts’ failure to
adjudicate constituted a violation of the BIT.  The tribunal agreed
with the claimants and determined on March 30, 2010 that Ecuador
had violated Article II(7) of the BIT,69 which provides that “[e]ach
Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing
rights with respect to investment, investment agreements, and
investment authorizations.”70  In so holding, the tribunal held that
Article II(7) was not fully congruent with the customary international
law standard relating to the denial of justice, but rather was “created
66. See Republic of It. v. Republic of Cuba, Sentence Sentence Préliminaire [Interim
Award], ¶ 65.
67. See Chevron Corp. (U.S.) and Texaco Petroleum Co. (U.S.) v. Republic of
Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, Partial Award on the Merits, ¶ 249 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0151.pdf.
68 See id. (noting that TexPet’s claims in Ecuadorian courts “remained undecided as
of the commencement of this arbitration”).
69. See id. ¶ 270.
70. U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 3, art. II(7).
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as an independent treaty standard to address a lack of clarity in the
customary international law regarding denial of justice,” with its “lex
specialis nature . . . confirmed by its origin and purpose.”71
Ecuador contended that the tribunal, in finding a breach of
Article II(7), committed legal error sufficiently serious to justify
setting aside the award.72  On June 8, 2010, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Ecuador, Ricardo Patiño Aroca, wrote to then-U.S.
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, on the subject of the
misinterpretation of Article II(7) of the Treaty.73  After decrying the
perceived errors in the award, the letter summarized Ecuador’s
understanding of Article II(7), including that it required no more than
the lower standard for denial of justice under customary international
law.  The letter then asked the U.S. government to confirm its
agreement with Ecuador’s interpretation of Article II(7) by reply
note, and that the failure to so confirm would be treated as
evidencing “’an unresolved dispute . . . between the Government of
the Republic of Ecuador and the Government of the United States of
America concerning the interpretation and application of the
Treaty.’”74  In August 2010, the United States sent a reply diplomatic
note to Ecuador’s Foreign Minister, attaching a letter from the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, which
stated that “’the U.S. government is currently reviewing the views
expressed in your letter and considering the concerns that you have
raised.’”75  In the interim, on July 7, 2010, Ecuador proceeded to
petition the District Court of The Hague (the place of arbitration) to
set aside the investor-state award in favor of TexPet and Chevron.76
71. Chevron Corp. (U.S.) and Texaco Petroleum (U.S.), Partial Award on the Merits,
¶ 243.
72. See Memorial of Respondent United States of America on Objections to
Jurisdiction, at 9–10, Republic of Ecuador v. U.S., PCA Case No. 2012-5 (Perm Ct. Arb.
2012), [hereinafter U.S. Memorial], available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita1060.pdf (referencing Ecuador’s submissions to the District Court of the
Hague).
73. See id. at 10–11 (citing a letter from Ricardo Patiño Aroca, Ecuadorian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Integration, to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State of June 8,
2010); see also Counter-Memorial of Claimant Republic of Ecuador on Jurisdiction, ¶ 13,
Republic of Ecuador v. U.S., PCA Case No. 2012-5 (Perm Ct. Arb. 2012), [hereinafter
Ecuador Counter-Memorial], available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0163.pdf.
74. U.S. Memorial, supra note 72, at 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the letter from
Ricardo Patiño Aroca, Ecuadorian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Integration, to
Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State of June 8, 2010).
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 9.
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In May 2012, the Dutch court denied Ecuador’s request.77
In the meantime, having received no further substantive
response from the United States government, Ecuador filed a request
for state-to-state arbitration on June 28, 2011, pursuant to Article
VII(1) of the BIT, which, predictably enough and typical of the
standard inter-state arbitration BIT provision, provides that “[a]ny
dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of the Treaty . . . shall be submitted, upon the request of
either Party, to an arbitral tribunal for binding decision in accordance
with the applicable rules of international law.”78
Maintaining that the tribunal was without jurisdiction under
the circumstances, the United States government sought and obtained
a bifurcation of the proceedings with an initial hearing on
jurisdictional matters.79  In support of its position, the U.S.
government argued primarily that there was no “dispute” between the
parties, as it had not taken a stand on the interpretation of Article
II(7), and thus the tribunal lacked jurisdiction under Article VII(1) of
the BIT.80  More relevant for our purposes, the United States further
argued that asserting jurisdiction over Ecuador’s claim was
inappropriate because it “would contradict a principal object and
purpose of the Treaty, which is to encourage investment by giving
assurances that, if disputes arise, investors can obtain final and
binding awards in a depoliticized forum.”81  Permitting such
jurisdiction would undermine investor-state arbitration and, by
extension, the entire system of investment arbitration.  In particular,
the United States warned of the significant uncertainty that would
arise regarding the supposedly final and binding nature of investor-
state awards:
Under Ecuador’s theory, States could unilaterally seek
a preferred interpretation of the Treaty through State-
to-State arbitration prior to an investor-State
arbitration, to try to deter an investor from bringing a
claim, during an investor-State arbitration, to
influence the outcome of that case; or after an
investment tribunal has issued its award, to use in
77. See Chevron Corp. (U.S.) and Texaco Petroleum Co. (U.S.) v. Republic of
Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, Judgment of the District Court of the Hague (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2012), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0923.pdf.
78. U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 3, art. VII(1).
79. See U.S. Memorial, supra note 72, at 7.
80. See id. at 15–34.
81. Id. at 5.
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annulment, set-aside, or enforcement proceedings.82
In response, Ecuador emphasized that the “ordinary meaning
of the terms of Article VII grants jurisdiction over any dispute
concerning interpretation or application of Article VII(1).”83  In
exercising its right to resolve the interpretive differences over Article
VII, Ecuador was not seeking to “appeal” the Chevron award, whose
final and binding character it acknowledged, but rather to clarify its
existing obligations under the BIT so that Ecuador can be in full
compliance thereof and thereby avoid future liability.84
Many memorials and a panoply of expert opinions later, the
case came to an anticlimactic end, with the tribunal dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction “due to the absence of the existence of a
dispute falling within the ambit of Article VII of the Treaty.”85  At
least, that is what we gather from the terse pronouncement on the
U.S. Department of State website, which is all we have to rely on as
the award is unpublished.86  In declining jurisdiction for failure to
locate a dispute between the parties, the tribunal would not have had
to reach the more fundamental question of the precise relationship
between state-to-state and investor-state arbitration, which remains a
very live issue.
III. THE UNRULY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE-TO-STATE AND
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
Examined separately and in isolation, each of the cases above
might suggest that the two arbitral regimes, while potentially on a
collision course, counteract one another in straightforward fashion.
Taken together, however, a much bigger and more chaotic picture
emerges of their interaction that suggests an organic relationship
evolving outside the conscious purview of states, which have paid it
little if any attention.  Many if not most BITs that contain both state-
to-state and investor-state arbitration provisions are silent on the
relationship between the two.87  As such, the primary legal authority
on the interaction between the two arbitral systems remains Article
27(1) of the 1965 ICSID Convention, which provides that:
82. Id.
83. See Ecuador Counter-Memorial, supra note 73, at 10.
84. See id. at 104–08.
85. See U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 3.
86. See id.
87. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection,
or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute
which one of its nationals and another Contracting
State shall have consented to submit or shall have
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless
such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide
by and comply with the award rendered in such
dispute.88
Under Article 27(1), a state party to the ICSID Convention is
barred from initiating state-to-state arbitration of any dispute that its
national (the investor) has consented to submit to ICSID investor-
state arbitration with the host state.89  Article 27(1) gives primacy to
investor-state arbitration in the event of conflict with state-to-state
arbitration both to avoid inconsistent awards as well as ensure the
depoliticization of the dispute resolution process.90  As noted above,
however, Article 27(1) on its face applies exclusively to home and
not host states.  Furthermore, it is triggered only when the investor
has consented to arbitration, which typically occurs at the point that
the investor submits a request for arbitration.91  Thus, whether the
terms of Article 27(1) permit state-to-state arbitration with respect to
any particular dispute turns on whether the home or host state is
initiating state-to-state arbitration as well as whether the parties have
commenced investor-state arbitration.  Specifically, the ICSID
Convention bars a home state from pursuing state-to-state arbitration
of an investment dispute only in the event of contemporaneous
investor-state arbitration, and does not bar a host state.  Or, as
rendered in tabular form:
88. ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 27(1).
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text.
91. See supra Part I.
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Whether State-to-State Arbitration Is Permitted























Notwithstanding its plain language, however, what little case
law we have on Article 27, including Banro American v. Congo and
Lucchetti v. Peru, would have us apply it not just to home states, but
also to investors and host states, respectively.92  Thus, for those cases
that follow the lead of Banro American and Lucchetti, the two
arbitral systems will interact differently so as to give us the following
outcomes instead:
92. See supra Part II.A–B.
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Whether State-to-State Arbitration Is Permitted
























It bears emphasizing that the tables above do not, of course,
represent the universe of relations between the two arbitral systems.
The question of how the two systems interact in any particular BIT
must first be considered by examining the terms thereof.  As
previously noted, many BITs are simply silent on how state-to-state
arbitration relates to investor-state arbitration.93  There are BITs that
explicitly prioritize between the two mechanisms, however, and it is
particularly noteworthy that many if not most of such BITs prioritize
investor-state arbitration over state-to-state arbitration along the lines
of Article 27(1).94  That is, these BITs prohibit state-to-state
93. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
94. The author has determined that, of the BITs that prioritize between the two
mechanisms, at least 17 BITs prioritize investor-state arbitration over state-to-state
arbitration. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Alg.-Turk., art. VIII(8), June 3, 1998, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/IIA/country/214/treaty/91; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Austria-Arm., art. 19(2), Oct. 17, 2001, available at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/9/treaty/165; Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Cameroon, art. VIII(9), Feb.
26, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-22 (1986); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Zaire, art. VIII(9), Aug. 3, 1984, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 99-17 (1986); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
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arbitration of any dispute that has been referred to investor-state
arbitration.  Yet other BITs can be interpreted as referring to the
relationship between the two indirectly. For instance, as discussed
above, the Italy-Cuba BIT can be regarded uniquely as folding
investor-state arbitration into state-to-state arbitration, thereby
effectively extinguishing the former.95  The Italy-Cuba BIT thus
presents an alternative (if cannibalistic) relationship between the two
systems that is not captured in the tables above.
Further and strictly speaking, Article 27(1) is only applicable
to those arbitral disputes that are governed by the ICSID Convention.
As such, investment disputes involving a state that is not party to the
ICSID Convention (or its nationals) are not subject to Article 27, and
there may be little guidance on the relationship between the two
arbitral systems when the relevant BIT is silent on the question.  That
said, as was described above, the Italy v. Cuba tribunal was
undeterred from applying Article 27(1) by “analogy” even though
Cuba did not agree to the rule, and Article 27(1) does not rise to the
level of customary international law.96
Given all the various ways the relationship between the two
arbitral systems may be delineated, and the legal uncertainty that
attends certain constructions thereof, the complete story of their
present interaction is accordingly a sprawling and incoherent one.  Its
complexities range beyond what many state parties to BITs ever
contemplated, or that is even conveyed by current literature on the
subject.  An informed appreciation of the confused state of affairs is,
however, a necessary first step to making sense of the troubled
relationship between the two arbitral regimes.  Pulling together the
various strands of discussion above, and focusing on the operation of
Article 27(1) and the relevant case law, one might summarize the
interaction of the two arbitral systems as manifesting thus far in at
least five distinct ways:
 When a home state or an investor seeks state-to-state
arbitration after the investor has consented to investor-
state arbitration;
 When a home state or an investor seeks state-to-state
arbitration before the investor has consented to
investor-state arbitration;
Protection of Investments, Dominica-Ger., art. 10(6), Oct. 1, 1984, 1476 U.N.T.S. 55,
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/59/treaty/1303 (full list on
file with the author).
95. See supra Part II.C.
96. See id.
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 When a BIT requires investor-state arbitration to be
conducted through state-to-state arbitration;
 When a host state initiates state-to-state arbitration
after the investor has consented to investor-state
arbitration; and
 When a host state initiates state-to-state arbitration
before the investor has consented to investor-state
arbitration.
As the discussion below argues, this unstable framework,
springing primarily from Article 27(1), is ultimately inconsistent with
the historical narrative of the two arbitral regimes and the averred
purposes of the ICSID Convention.
IV. A PROPOSED RECONCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
STATE-TO-STATE AND INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
On its terms, Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention bars
state-to-state arbitration initiated by home states but not host states,
and then only when the investor has consented to investor-state
arbitration of the relevant dispute.  Yet, both the qualification
limiting the reach of Article 27(1) to home states and disputes to
which investors have already consented are inconsistent with the
purposes of Article 27 and the ICSID Convention more broadly.  As
discussed above, the rationale behind Article 27(1) giving priority to
investor-state arbitration when the same dispute can be resolved
through both arbitral mechanisms is to avoid inconsistent awards, as
well as ensure the depoliticization of the dispute resolution process.97
However, duplicative, politicized proceedings and the potential for
conflicting awards result whether state-to-state arbitration is initiated
by the home or host state after investor-state arbitration has
commenced.  For example, in both the Lucchetti and Ecuador v. U.S.
cases, the host state initiated state-to-state arbitration to resolve a
dispute that was arguably the subject of existing investor-state
proceedings, thereby presenting the same potential for conflicting
awards and the politicization of the dispute through the engagement
of both states in the process.98
As with limiting the application of Article 27(1) to host states,
structuring its prohibition of state-to-state arbitration only at the point
97. See supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text.
98. See supra Parts II.B, D.
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when the investor has consented to investor-state arbitration is ill
considered.  An investor could deliberately hold off on bringing an
investment claim, and instead collude with or pressure its home state
strategically to initiate state-to-state arbitration first against the host
state.  This way, the investor gets a second bite of the apple because
it is free to initiate investor-state arbitration of the same claim should
the state-to-state arbitration be resolved against the home state.
Again, the same risks of conflicting awards resulting from
duplicative proceedings and of the politicization of the dispute are
presented here.  In short, Article 27(1) fails comprehensively to
address its averred concerns.
A far more coherent rule would be to bar state-to-state
arbitration, whether initiated by the home or host state, of any dispute
that would properly be resolved by investor-state arbitration—
meaning any issue over which the investor-state arbitral tribunal
would have jurisdiction—regardless of whether the investor has yet
to consent to arbitration.  Going back to the tabular format employed
above, the outcomes for such a rule would look like the following:
Whether State-to-State Arbitration Is Permitted























This proposed rule would also be consistent with the
historical progression of the two arbitral systems.  As an initial
matter, state-to-state arbitration has traditionally been and continues
to be relied upon predominantly to resolve territorial boundary
disputes.  To the extent it was relied upon to resolve investment
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disputes, it has been categorically superseded by investor-state
arbitration, which was designed to replace all manner of diplomatic
protection as a means of resolving foreign investment disputes.
Investor-state arbitration allows the investor effectively to seek
redress of injury to its investment, and in a way that takes politics out
of the equation.99  So long as the investor is able to invoke the
investor-state arbitration provisions to resolve the particular
investment dispute, there is little reason to allow for state-to-state
arbitration of the same dispute regardless of whether the investor has
in fact initiated arbitral proceedings.  Indeed, even though its actual
language falls short, the rationale expressed behind what eventually
became Article 27 in the relevant travaux of the ICSID Convention
supports this view:
It would seem to be a natural concomitant of the
recognition of the private party’s right of direct access
to an international jurisdiction, to exclude action by its
national State in cases in which such access is
available under the Convention.100
Fashioned thus, duplicative proceedings leading to potentially
inconsistent awards will be avoided and ICSID, as Aron Broches, its
architect and then General Counsel of the World Bank observed, can
then truly serve as “a means of settling directly, on the legal plane,
investment disputes between the State and the foreign investor and
insulate such disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy.”101
Further, the proposed rule avoids the due process concerns
potentially raised when state-to-state arbitration is prioritized over
investor-state arbitration respecting any investment dispute.  While
state-to-state arbitration procedures resemble those in international
commercial arbitration, they generally allow for significantly less
witness evidence and discovery “both because of customary practice
and notions of state sovereignty and governmental secrecy.”102  For
the same reasons, one would not expect a state-to-state arbitral
tribunal to allow readily for amicus or other third party participation,
99. See supra Part I.
100. Working Paper R 62-1 (SD) (June 5, 1962), Comment to Art. II(5), in THE WORLD
BANK, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION
OF THE CONVENTION 24 (1970) (emphasis added).
101. Consultative Meeting of Legal Experts in Bangkok Chairman’s Opening Address
(April 27, 1964), in THE WORLD BANK, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING
THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 464 (1970).
102. See BORN, supra note 17, at 442.
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particularly when the third party is a private investor.  An investor
with a stake in the state-to-state arbitration proceedings will face
significant challenges then in having its voice heard.
Conversely, the third party home state in any investor-state
arbitration will not have to surmount quite the same difficulties in
having its view represented.  Take the Ecuador v. U.S. case as an
example.  As the host state in the investor-state arbitration, Ecuador
of course had every opportunity to present its arguments in the
underlying investor-state arbitration against Chevron and TexPet.  If
the home state, the United States here, had a unique interest and
viewpoint to defend, it could have applied for amicus status with the
investor-state arbitration tribunal, which would have given the
application serious consideration given the status of the United States
as the other state party to the BIT.  Now consider the scenario in
reverse and suppose that Ecuador had hurriedly initiated state-to-state
arbitration proceedings against the United States in anticipation of
and before Chevron and TexPet had initiated investor-state
arbitration, seeking a declaration that Article II(7) of the U.S.-
Ecuador BIT did not present a higher bar than the standard for denial
of justice under customary international law.  Chevron and TexPet
would surely have experienced far more difficulty than the United
States in gaining access to state-to-state and investor-state arbitration
proceedings, respectively, and having their views represented, even
though they had a critical interest in the outcome.  By precluding
state-to-state arbitration for any issue over which an investor-state
tribunal would have jurisdiction, the proposed rule would neuter such
gamesmanship as well as any accompanying due process concerns.
It needs to be emphasized that the proposed rule does not
render state-to-state arbitration superfluous.  Indeed, it applies only to
bar state-to-state arbitration for any issue that the investor-state
arbitral tribunal would have jurisdiction over and thus may resolve.
That is, the table above does not represent the sum of all issues that
may arise among investors and states, but only those issues that can
properly be so resolved by investor-state arbitration.  For instance,
state-to-state arbitration (but not investor-state arbitration) is plainly
appropriate for disputes arising from a state’s failure to enforce a
final award, or regarding whether a state party may terminate a BIT
early and to the detriment of prospective investors.103  It is true that
103. See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 27(1) (“No Contracting State shall give
diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its
nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall
have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.” (emphasis
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the scope of state-to-state arbitration is circumscribed as a result, but
that is a natural and necessary result of recognizing the purposive
primacy of investor-state arbitration in investment treaties.
Further, the prioritization of investor-state arbitration finds
support in Professor Michael Reisman’s expert opinion in Ecuador v.
U.S.  In Reisman’s view, the two arbitration tracks created by the
BIT are each assigned a distinct jurisdiction ratione personae
(personal jurisdiction) and ratione materiae (subject matter
jurisdiction).104  Concerning personal jurisdiction, the investor-state
track affords standing to the investor and the host state (but not the
home state), while the state-to-state track provides standing to the
state parties to the BIT (but not the investor).105  With regard to
subject matter jurisdiction, and consistent with the BIT’s purpose of
promoting investment including through effecting and depoliticizing
the resolution of any dispute between the host state and the investor,
the interpretation of substantive rights and guarantees in the BIT is
reserved for the investor-state track.106 Other issues such as disputes
arising from a state’s non-enforcement of a final award or purported
denunciation of a treaty are reserved for the state-to-state track.107  As
Reisman explains, having deliberately induced investment by
conferring investment protection benefits on third-party investors,
including through the introduction of an autonomous investor-state
dispute resolution system, the BIT must be interpreted in a way that
protects the stability of resulting expectations on the part of
investors.108
In fundamentally reconceiving the relationship between the
two arbitral regimes, however, the proposed rule advocates a position
that not surprisingly varies from those of other commentators.  It may
inform the discussion to consider them briefly—even if in
unavoidably broad strokes—as they pertain to the proposed rule.  For
added)); see also Reisman Opinion, supra note 61, ¶ 30 (describing the two-track
jurisdiction structure in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, which reserves “disputes concerning
interpretation or application” for state-to-state arbitration, and concluding that this includes
jurisdiction “to hear, for example, disputes arising from one state’s non-enforcement of a
final award; or disputes when one state purports to denounce the treaty”).
104. See Reisman Opinion, supra note 61, ¶ 3.
105. See id. ¶¶ 21–22.
106. See id. ¶ 25.  My proposal, however, goes further and argues that the interpretation
of rights in the BIT is reserved for the investor-state track not only when a party initiates
investor-state arbitration, but whenever a party may do so.
107. See id. ¶ 30.
108. See id. ¶ 26.
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Clovis Trevino, the universe of investment issues implicating both
state-to-state and investor-state arbitration cleaves into two:  (1)
diplomatic protection claims brought by host states under investment
treaties, and (2) investment treaty interpretive matters not directly
connected with the application of substantive treaty standards.109
This division is, however, incomplete and not fully resolved.
Regarding the latter, Trevino specifically argues—and
uncontroversially so—that BIT interstate arbitration is available for
settling the latter issues, yet does not clearly articulate whether it
should legally and normatively be available for treaty interpretive
matters that directly concern substantive treaty standards, including,
for example, the claim brought in Ecuador v. U.S.110  Regarding the
former, Trevino appears content to allow home states to bring
diplomatic claims on behalf of their nationals through state-to-state
arbitration subject to the operation of the rule expressed in Article
27(1) of the ICSID Convention.111  That is, she maintains that such
claims should be permissible so long as the investor has not
consented to investor-state arbitration.  Yet she also forthrightly
acknowledges that this could lead to “the illogical result that the host
state would face two consecutive litigations arising out of
(substantially) the same operative facts.”112  Further, as noted above,
such an interpretation of the rule would presumably allow host states
to initiate state-to-state arbitration of issues concerning the
application of substantive treaty standards regardless of whether
investor-state arbitration on the same issues has been initiated, since
Article 27(1) is silent on that issue.  This defeats the purpose behind
Article 27(1) of avoiding duplicative claims and political
controversy.  Trevino, however, does not address this oversight, and
it is not clear where or how it would fit comfortably in her
dichotomy.  More generally, while Trevino recognizes that tension
can arise from parallel proceedings depending on when the interstate
interpretive dispute is brought relative to the investor-state
proceedings,113 she is prepared to rely on whichever tribunal is
subsequently seized of the dispute to stay its proceedings pending the
109. See Trevino, supra note 9, at 212–33.
110. See id. at 210–11 (noting the “thin line between interpretive claims and diplomatic
protection claims,” and that “this classification is not as clear-cut as it would appear at first
sight,” but not discussing where or how to draw the distinction).
111. See id. at 213–20, 231 (“I argued that claims for the purpose of implementing state
responsibility may be submitted within the BIT interstate framework, provided that Article
27 of the ICSID Convention (or similar provision in a BIT) is not operative.”).
112. Id. at 215.
113. See id. at 225–31.
2014] THE SUBVERSION OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 41
resolution of the first dispute.114  Quite aside from the fact that such a
tribunal has neither the obligation nor the incentive to do so,
Trevino’s proposal could encourage an unseemly race between the
host state and the investor or collusion between the home state and
the investor, and is ultimately unsatisfactory.
Coming from a different direction, Justice and Professor
Chang-fa Lo advocates relying on the good faith principle to resolve
any conflict between parallel or successive state-to-state and
investor-state arbitration proceedings.115  In the process, Lo also
considers applying lis pendens and res judicata, but ultimately finds
them wanting in part because, as strictly construed, they require
identity of or privity between the parties and identical claims in both
arbitral proceedings.116  Instead, Lo turns to what he views as the
generally applicable international law principle of good faith.117  In
essence, Lo suggests that the tribunal constituted later in time—
whether it be the investor-state or state-to-state arbitration tribunal—
judiciously apply the generally applicable international law principle
of good faith to either suspend or dismiss in part or whole its
proceedings in deference to the tribunal that is first seized of the
dispute.118
One difficulty with Lo’s approach is that it may ironically
encourage a race between the investor and the host state to initiate
arbitration in different fora, which may not be perceived as consistent
with the precept of good faith and cannot be resolved by good faith
principles per se.  For example, say Ecuador and Chevron each
rushes to initiate state-to-state and investor-state arbitration,
respectively, and Chevron beats Ecuador to the line.  Should the
state-to-state arbitration tribunal suspend its proceedings concerning
Ecuador’s claims in that event?  Or can it refuse to do so on the
ground that Chevron was not acting in good faith in rushing to
initiate arbitral proceedings, even though Ecuador was equally guilty
of the same conduct?
Other difficulties arising from the nebulous nature of “good
faith” are present even in the absence of a race.  Let us suppose
instead that Chevron was slow off the blocks and Ecuador
strategically filed its state-to-state arbitration, fully intending to block
114. See id.
115. See Lo, supra note 44.
116. See id. at 15, 22–23.
117. See id. at 17–18.
118. See id. at 17–21.
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any subsequent effort by Chevron to initiate investor-state arbitration.
Should Ecuador be deemed to be acting in bad faith even though (1)
Ecuador was formally entitled to bring such a state-to-state
arbitration claim, and (2) Chevron was always free to file its investor-
state claim?  As the example suggests, reliance on good faith
principles in this context can lead to significant uncertainty of
outcome.
Moreover, Lo’s proposal of managing the interplay between
the two arbitral systems by looking principally to good faith
principles is also problematic insofar as it fails to refer to, and thus
take into account, Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention and its
prioritization of investor-state over state-to-state arbitration.
Professor Anthea Roberts argues for yet a different approach.
Roberts expressly rejects any attempt to limit drastically the scope
and availability of state-to-state arbitration in favor of investor-state
arbitration on the ground that it is inconsistent with the text, purpose,
or history of investment treaties.119  Instead, she views the parallel
existence of the two arbitral procedures without a clear priority
system as a reality of investment treaties that reflects the system’s
essential hybridity and tension among the interests of investors, host
states, and home states.120  Roberts welcomes state-to-state
arbitration as a way in which state parties can reengage with and
influence the investment treaty system.121  She posits a framework to
accommodate its hybrid nature based on the understanding that
investment treaty rights are granted to investors and home states on
an interdependent basis, and that interpretive authority is shared
among the state parties, investor-state tribunals, and state-to-state
119. See Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration:  A Hybrid
Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1,
5–70 (2014).
120. See id. at 5, 14.
121. See id. at 5 (“[T]he re-emergence of state-to-state arbitration represents an
important step toward a new third era of the investment treaty system in which the rights and
claims of both investors and treaty parties are recognized and valued, rather than one being
reflexively privileged over the other. . . .  Instead of being an illegitimate or regressive
development, the re-emergence of state-to-state arbitration represents a permissible and
potentially progressive mechanism by which treaty parties can re-engage with the system in
order to correct existing imbalances and shape its development from within.”).
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tribunals.122  Roberts’ framework ultimately rests on the conclusion
that the text, object and purpose, and history of investment treaties do
not support prioritizing investor-state arbitration over state-to-state
arbitration.123  But to advance her theory, she needs to do more than
prove a negative:  she must demonstrate that this holistic reading of
the treaties affirmatively supports her contention of the system as
neutral and hybridized in nature; otherwise, both interpretations are
equally unsupported, and we are left without any compelling
proposal.
While it is true, as Roberts notes, that investor-state
arbitration was generally inserted in addition to, rather than in place
of, state-to-state arbitration in investment treaties and typically
without reference to their relationship,124 this hardly demonstrates
that the treaty parties intended for both arbitral procedures to be
generally available without any prioritization between them.  As
discussed earlier, a better explanation is that state-to-state arbitration
provisions were a carryover from FCNs, and that states were
subsequently introducing investor-state arbitration provisions into
BITs alongside the state-to-state arbitration provisions without
adequately considering their relationship.125  There was, after all,
little reason to do so because investor-state arbitration was designed
to replace diplomatic protection as an autonomous system of
resolving investment disputes without any involvement of the home
state save when the host state failed to make good on an award issued
against it.126  Additionally, it is worth noting that state-to-state
122. See id. at 5–6, 69 (arguing that “the co-existence of state-to-state and investor-state
arbitral mechanisms requires a new theoretical framework that can capture the hybrid nature
of the investment treaty system. . . .  In developing a hybrid theory that accounts for both, I
argue that:  (1) investment treaty rights should be understood as being granted to investors
and home states on an interdependent basis, such that either—but usually not both—may
bring arbitral claims; and (2) interpretive authority should be understood as being shared
between the treaty parties, investor-state tribunals, and state-to-state tribunals”) (also noting
that “we should move into a third era based on the ideas that investment treaty rights are
granted to investors and home states on an interdependent basis, and interpretive authority is
shared between the treaty parties, investor-state tribunals, and state-to-state tribunals”).
123. See id. at 5 (arguing that “attempts to radically curtail the scope and availability of
state-to-state arbitration in favor of investor-state arbitration are inconsistent with the text,
object and purpose, and history of investment treaties”).
124. See id. at 11 (“Investor-state arbitration is generally inserted in addition to, rather
than in the place of, state-to-state arbitration. The right of states to bring state-to-state
claims was not precluded. Investor-state claims were not given priority over, or expressly
insulated from, state-to-state claims.”).
125. See supra Part I.
126. See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 27(1) (“No Contracting State shall give
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arbitration provisions have been invoked on only a handful of
occasions, even though they have been a feature of a great many
BITs for decades now. One may not simply wave away the
lopsidedly infinitesimal number of state-to-state arbitrations on
account of the reluctance of home states to espouse the claims of
their nationals.127 Indeed, the politicization of what are essentially
investor-state disputes is precisely why investor-state arbitration is
and should be prioritized. It also fails to explain why no states have
sought state-to-state arbitration under a BIT to resolve purely
interpretive disputes that do not implicate existing investor-state
disputes.
The simpler and more cogent explanation is that to the extent
states contemplated the matter, they did not consider it necessary to
introduce prioritizing language insofar as the ICSID Convention, and
therefore Article 27(1) thereof, was applicable to the investment
treaty.  Given that ICSID was established prior to the generation of
modern BITs that included investor-state arbitration provisions,
Article 27(1) constitutes the context in and background against which
BITs were negotiated.  In prohibiting home states from initiating
state-to-state arbitration of any dispute that has been submitted to
investor-state arbitration, and not vice versa, Article 27(1) plainly
prioritizes investor-state arbitration and is not a neutral sequencing
provision.128
diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its
nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall
have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.”).
127. But see Roberts, supra note 119, at 48 & n.220 (arguing that “as a matter of law,
we should not confuse the small number of state-to-state arbitrations as a matter of practice
with the inability of treaty parties to bring state-to-state claims or the inferiority of such
claims”) (citing NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT,
POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTIONER’S GUIDE 415 (2005) (“Most
investment treaties are silent on this point, however, leaving open the possibility of State
espousal in parallel to an investor-State claim . . . . [However,] many States may be reluctant
to espouse the claims of investors who can benefit from such an alternative remedy.”)).
128. See supra Part I.  It is not entirely clear to the author what Roberts would consider
to be the import of Article 27(1).  On the one hand, she appears to acknowledge that its uni-
directional structure is justified because “we should expect that investor-state arbitration will
remain the primary mechanism for dealing with investment disputes” and “diplomatic
protection is intervening as a residual mechanism to be resorted to in the absence of other
arrangements recognizing the direct right of action by individuals.” See Roberts, supra note
119, at 48 (citations omitted).  On the other hand, Roberts maintains that “[i]n the absence of
an express provision creating a hierarchy or endorsing symmetrical or asymmetrical
sequencing, it is an open question which approach should be implied.” Id. at 48–49.
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As to object and purpose, Roberts maintains that the goals of
investment protection and the depoliticization of investment disputes
are not absolute, and further cannot remove all interpretive doubts.
In her view, adopting a general interpretive presumption in favor of
investors would be unjustified given how short and vague investment
treaties are, and can only “result[] in a heavily skewed analysis that
overly stacks the deck in favor of investors’ interests.”129  As an
initial matter, it bears observing that an approach that looks primarily
to investor-state arbitration favors neither the investor nor the state.
Rather, it favors the resolution of any investment dispute in the forum
designed and bargained for that purpose, namely investor-state
arbitration, and whose outcome is not preordained in favor of either
the investor or the state.  Indeed, the statistics show that states prevail
more frequently than investors in investor-state arbitrations under
investment treaties. Of the 274 known concluded treaty-based
investor-state dispute settlement cases, approximately 43% were
decided in favor of the state, 31% were decided in favor of the
investor, and 26% were settled.130
Additionally, skeletal as investment treaties can be, they very
often will declare their purpose, which will invariably be the
encouragement and protection of investment, and frequently also the
creation of a stable framework for investment.131  Indeed, the very
structure of investment treaties, insofar as the treaties provide
guarantees and benefits to investors132 but typically do not also
impose obligations on the investors, leaves little doubt that the
investment regime is deliberately investor-centric.  Under these
129. Roberts, supra note 119, at 12–13 (“Some tribunals have concluded that, as
investment treaties were intended to protect foreign investment, all uncertainties should be
resolved in favor of investors. As investment treaties tend to be short, vague, and full of
gaps, adopting a general interpretive presumption in favor of investor protection results in a
heavily skewed analysis that overly stacks the deck in favor of investors’ interests.”).
130. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Recent Developments in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), at 1 (Apr. 2014), available at
http://unctad.org0/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf.
131. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 23, at 65 (citations omitted)
(“[International investment agreements] have a recognizable look. . . .  For example, a
common title is ‘Treaty between [one contracting party] and [the other contracting party]
concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment.’  Preambles are also
often similar, providing a short statement of purposes such as ‘desiring’ to promote greater
economic cooperation, ‘recognising’ that an agreement on the treatment of investment will
stimulate the flow of private investment, and ‘agreeing’ in this context on the importance of
a stable framework for investment.”).
132. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 55, at 25 (“BITs give guarantees to investors
but do not normally address obligations of investors.”).
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circumstances, it is not at all surprising, as Roberts herself points out,
that some tribunals have concluded that because investment treaties
were intended to protect foreign investment, all uncertainties should
be resolved in favor of investors.133  Correspondingly, any tension
between state-to-state and investor-state arbitration should be
resolved in favor of the latter.
To sum up, I conclude that on balance, the text, object and
purpose, and history of investment treaties support the rule proposed
by this Article.
A. The Text of Article 27(1)
All things considered, however, perhaps the most formidable
obstacle to implementation of this Article’s proposed rule is the text
of Article 27(1) itself (or a similar BIT provision).  Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, the cardinal rule for
interpreting treaties, provides in part that “[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.”134  The plain language of Article 27(1) and
the fact that the Convention’s travaux préparatoires evidence
deliberation on the relationship between investor-state and state-to-
state investment treaty arbitration suggest that the two qualifications
criticized above were intended.135  That is, the “ordinary meaning” of
Article 27(1) is that it applies only to home states, and is further
triggered only upon the investor consenting to arbitration.  There is
some—but not much—wiggle room with regard to the former
qualification in that Article 27(1) does not explicitly exclude host
states from its scope.  Nevertheless, like the Banro American
tribunal,136 one might read Article 27(1) in tandem with Article 26,
133. See Roberts, supra note 119, at 12 (citations omitted) (“Some tribunals have
concluded that, as investment treaties were intended to protect foreign investment, all
uncertainties should be resolved in favor of investors.”).
134. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
135. See generally SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 35, at 420–22.
136. See Banro American Res., Inc. & Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema
S.A.R.L. v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/7, Award of the Tribunal (Sept. 1,
2000) (excerpts), 17 (2) ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J. 382 (2002) (“It is for this reason, as
noted by Schreuer, that Article 27 should be read in view of Article 26, which constitutes its
actual context and according to which the consent to ICSID arbitration ‘shall, unless
otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other
remedy.’”).
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which states in relevant part that “[c]onsent of the parties to
arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be
deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other
remedy.”137  Article 26 is the clearest expression yet of the self-
contained and autonomous nature of investor-state arbitration under
ICSID.138  It necessarily and naturally complements Article 27,
which for that reason “must also be seen in the context of the
exclusive remedy rule of Art. 26.”139  As the Banro American
tribunal put it:
Regarding the purpose and aim of the ICSID
Convention, they are to exclude diplomatic protection,
along with its political drawbacks, for the benefit of
[ICSID] arbitration channels . . . . The exclusion of
diplomatic protection is, we note, inherent in the
system, of which it constitutes an essential element,
and we thus understand that it precludes derogation by
the parties. . . . Any method of combining diplomatic
protection with ICSID arbitration is precluded.140
Moreover, the three tribunals that have considered Article
27(1), i.e., Banro America, Lucchetti, and Italy v. Cuba, have all
taken positions that arguably depart from its literal application in
favor of preserving the integrity of investor-state arbitration,
highlighting the important role played by the Convention’s “object
and purpose” in its interpretation that would favor the proposal
argued herein.  Further, while Christoph Schreuer has noted in his
authoritative treatise on the ICSID Convention that the text of Article
27(1) preserves the investor’s option to request diplomatic protection
from its home state so long as the investor has not consented to
arbitration, he has at the same time observed that “[a] choice between
ICSID arbitration and diplomatic protection appears to be contrary to
at least some of the avowed purposes of Art. 27.”141  In sum,
notwithstanding the difficulties posed by the language of Article
27(1), the more reasoned approach to resolving the tension between
the two arbitral regimes is to disallow state-to-state arbitration of any
issue that can and should ordinarily be resolved through investor-
state arbitration.
137. ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 26.
138. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 35, at 351–52.
139. Christoph Schreuer¸ Commentary on Article 27 of the ICSID Convention, 12(1)
ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J., 205, 207 (1997).
140. Banro American Res., Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/7, Award of the Tribunal,
¶¶ 19, 21.
141. SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 35, at 425.
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CONCLUSION
While many, if not most, BITs contain both state-to-state and
investor-state arbitration provisions, the relationship between the two
has been little studied.  This paper’s systematic analysis of recent
cases brings to light the surprisingly unruly, almost dysfunctional
relationship between the two arbitral regimes.  This paper traces the
contours of the disorder as spawned by Article 27(1) of the ICSID
Convention to emphasize its textual inconsistency with the history of
the relationship between the regimes and the purposes of the
Convention.  Specifically, the fact that Article 27(1) applies on its
terms to home but not host states, and is triggered only upon the
investor consenting to arbitration, leaves room for duplicative and
politicized arbitral proceedings of the same dispute and thus
conflicting awards.  The more coherent approach is to treat the two
arbitral systems as mutually exclusive, and to preclude state-to-state
arbitration of any dispute that is properly resolved through investor-
state arbitration regardless of whether the investor has yet to consent
to arbitration.  As reconceived by my proposal, the relationship
between the two arbitral systems finally reflects the historical
primacy of investor-state arbitration in investment dispute resolution,
averts the risk of conflicting awards, and shields the dispute from
entanglement with politics and diplomacy.
